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KNIGHT V. HALLSTHAMM,4R: THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY REVISITED
I. INTRODUCTION
In Green v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court recog-
nized an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. The
warranty implies a landlord's covenant that the leased premises will be
maintained in a habitable state3 for the duration of the the lease. The
1. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
2. I at 619, 517 P.2d at 1169, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 705. In Green, the court reasoned:
Under traditional common law doctrine, long followed in California, a landlord
was under no duty to maintain leased dwellings in habitable condition during the
term of the lease. In the past several years, however, the highest courts of a rapidly
growing number of states and the District of Columbia have reexamined the bases
of the old common law and have uniformly determined that it no longer corre-
sponds to the realties of the modern urban landlord-tenant relationship.
Id The Green court held that the warranty does not require that a landlord ensure that the
leased premises are in a perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but that "bare living re-
quirements" must be maintained. In most cases, substantial compliance with building and
'hbusing codes which materially affect health and safety suffice to meet the landlord's obliga-
tions. Id at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182-83, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19. The standards of "ten-
antability" set out in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (West Supp. 1982) also provide guidance in
determining whether the landlord has satisfied the warranty of habitability. Id at 637-38
n.23, 517 P.2d at 1183 n.23, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 719 n.23; see infra note 43 for the text of
§ 1941.1.
3. As a good indication of the general scope of the warranty of habitability, the Green
court cited Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482, 268 A.2d 556, 559
(1970), where the court held that "[i]n a modern society one cannot be expected to live in a
multi-storied apartment building without heat, hot water, garbage disposal or elevator serv-
ice" and the "[flailure to supply such things is a breach of the implied covenant of habitabil-
ity." 10 Cal. 3d at 637 n.22, 517 P.2d at 1182 n.22, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718 n.22. In Green, the
following defects rendered the premises uninhabitable: 1) the collapse and nonrepair of the
bathroom ceiling; 2) the continued presence of rats, mice, and cockroaches; 3) the lack of
any heat in four rooms; 4) plumbing blockages; 5) exposed and faulty wiring; and 6) an
illegally installed and dangerous stove. Id at 621, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rtpr. at 706.
4. 10 Cal. 3d at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The Green court's abolish-
ment of the common law rule of caveat emptor and imposition on a landlord of a duty to
maintain leased premises in a habitable condition reconciled California law with the major-
ity of jurisdictions.
At common law, the real estate lease was viewed under property law concepts because
the lease was considered a conveyance of the premises for a term of years, subject to the
doctrine of caveat emptor. C. SMIm & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 138,
140-41 (2d ed. 1971); 1 H. TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 86, at 556-58 (1912); 6 S. WILLISTON, CoNrRAcTs 890, at 580-89 (3d ed. 1962). Thus, the
landlord owed no duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and no obligation to
repair. Id These precepts suited the era of agrarianism in which they arose because the
primary value of the lease was the land itself. Additionally, the simple living structures were
of secondary importance and repairable by the lessee. 10 Cal. 3d at 622, 517 P.2d at 1172,
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Green court further held that a landlord's breach of the implied war-
II Cal. Rptr. at 708. Because property law crystallized before the development of mutually
dependent covenants in contract law, the lessee's covenant to pay rent and any of the lessor's
covenants were independent. Id
However, in today's urban residential leases, land, as such, is of little importance. The
lessee cannot realistically be viewed as acquiring an interest in land. Id at 623, 517 P.2d at
1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708. Rather, the lessee has contracted for a place to live "'which
includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light ad ventilation ... .'"
Id (quoting Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970)). For a further discussion of the obsolescence of the principle of caveat
emptor and the landlord-tenant relationship, see Lesar, Landlord and Tenant RefArm, 35
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279, 1285-87 (1960); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant. A
Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 227-
28, 23 1-32 (1969); Rose, Responsibility of Landlords for Conditions of Habitability, 1 RnAL
ESTATE L.J. 53, 54-59 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rose]; Skiliern, Implied Warranties in
Leases. The Needfor Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387, 387-88, 397-98 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Skillern].
The implied warranty of habitability had been recognized in the following cases: Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.) (recognition of implied warranty of
habitability based upon urban tenant's interest in a dwelling suitable for occupation, and not
land itself, the better position of landlord to maintain premises in a habitable state, shortage
of adequate housing, and detrimental effect of substandard housing on society as a whole),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969)
(court gave recognition to change in lease transaction to basically one between landlord and
tenant, and to contemporary housing realities, and stated that landlord covenants that prem-
ises are fit for intended use); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 11. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972)
(court found reasoning of Javbzs decision persuasive and implied a warranty of habitability
which is fulfilled by substantial compliance with pertinent provisions of building code);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972) (common law concepts lost their vitality in era of
industrialization, with exploding urban population; and landlord is in superior position with
respect to knowledge of housing law violations and discovering deficiencies); Steele v. La-
timer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974) (development of common law is determined by
social needs of society it was designed to serve and capacity for growth and change is signifi-
cant; lease must be viewed essentially as a contract and economic realities recognized by
court in Javins support recognition of warranty); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973) (implied warranty of habitability judicially imposed so
that common law concept of lease would conform with statutory law which recognized that
tenant's payment of rent and landlord's obligation to maintain habitable premises are mutu-
ally dependent covenants); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (war-
ranty of habitability imposed based on contemporary housing shortage and resultant
inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant, and landlord's superior knowl-
edge of condition of the premises); Kline v. Bums, Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971) (im-
plied warranty of habitability arose by operation of law because of recognition of modem-
day landlord-tenant relationship, whereby tenant contracts with landlord for habitable
premises); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,265 A.2d 526 (1970) (historical view of lease as sale
of interest in land suitable for agrarian setting in which it arose, but could not be reconciled
with changes in dwelling habits and economic realities; object of letting is to furnish tenant
with liveable residence); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (tenant is not
interested in land, but in house suitable for occupation, and tenant's promise to pay rent is in
exchange for landlord's promise to provide habitable dwelling); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) (rule prohibiting implied warranty of habitability in leases in-
consistent with current legislative policy concerning housing standards; and need and social
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ranty was a defense to an unlawful detainer action.5 While the Green
decision did not delineate the specific elements of the defense of the
breach of the implied warranty of habitability, stringent prerequisites
for pleading the landlord's breach6 were set forth by the court of appeal
in Quevedo v. Braga.7
In Knight v. Hallsthammar,s the California Supreme Court held
that the prerequisites established in Quevedo were inapplicable to a
breach of the warranty of habitability when asserted as a defense in an
desirability of adequate housing could not be defeated by outdated doctrine of caveat
emptor).
Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island and Wisconsin have
statutorily implied a warranty of habitability in residential leases. IDAHO CODE § 6-320(5)
(1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021(2) (West 1981); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 554.139 (Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16 (Supp. 1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 1981).
5. 10 Cal. 3d at 619, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706. "[A] defendant in an
unlawful detainer action may raise any affirmative defense which, if established, will pre-
serve the tenant's possession of the premises." Id at 620, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at
706. The Green court held that a landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability
directly relates to whether any rent is due and owing by the tenant and may be determina-
tive of the landlord's entitlement to possession upon a tenant's nonpayment of rent. Id
"Accordingly, the tenant may properly raise the issue of warranty of habitability in an un-
lawful detainer action." Id If the trial court determines that the landlord's breach of the
implied warranty is total and no rent is due, judgment is entered for the defendant in the
unlawful detainer action. If the damages from the breach of warranty justify a partial rent
reduction, the tenant may maintain possession of the premises only if he or she pays that
portion of the back rent that is owing; if the tenant fails to pay such sum, the landlord is
entitled to possession. The landlord is also entitled to possession if he or she has not
breached the implied warranty. Id at 639, 517 P.2d at 1184, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 720; see infra
note 19 for a discussion of the California statutes concerning unlawful detainer actions.
A California tenant can also assert a landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habit-
ability in an affirmative action for damages. Quevedo v. Braga, 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 140
Cal. Rptr. 143 (1977). "[T]he doctrine of implied warranty already applied.., to the con-
tractual relationship created by the lease of a dwelling unit will support an independent
cause of action for damages." Id at 7, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47. Some jurisdictions have
expressly recognized a tenant's right to assert the basic contract remedies of damages, refor-
mation and rescission if the landlord breaches the implied warranty of habitability. See,
e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969); Kline v. Burns, Ill
N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971). THE UNiFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT AcT § 4.101(b) [hereinafter cited as URLTA] provides that a tenant may obtain injunc-
tive relief for the landlord's noncompliance with the obligation imposed by § 2.104. See
infra note 173. A tenant in possession may also bring an action for specific performance of
the landlord's obligations under the implied warranty of habitability. Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See
also Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Defense to Unlawful Detainer Actions, 63
CALIF. L. REv. 301, 315-22 (1975).
6. 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 140 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1977).
7. See infra text accompanying note 29.
8. 29 Cal. 3d 46, 623 P.2d 268, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1981).
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unlawful detainer action.9 The Knight court held that the implied war-
ranty of habitability is not waived where a tenant knows of defects or
fails to inspect the premises prior to occupancy.10 The court further
refused to restrict the defense to situations where the landlord had been
allowed a reasonable time to repair, while the tenant remained in pos-
session, following notice of the defects. ". The Knight court focused on
the actual habitability of the premises in determining the landlord's
breach of the implied warranty; the tenant's knowledge of defects and
the landlord's opportunity to correct the defects were irrelevant to the
court's inquiry.'
2
This note will discuss: 1) the elements of the breach of the implied
warranty of habitability as set forth in Knight; 2) the issue of a tenant's
waiver of the warranty; 3) the issue of notice to the landlord of a
breach; and 4) the effect of a change in ownership of the leased prem-
ises on the tenant's right to assert a breach of the warranty. This note
concludes by discussing the Knight court's development of the implied
warranty of habitability and the signficance it will have on tenants' as-
sertion of the landlord's breach of the warranty.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
On May 18, 1977, James E. Knight purchased a thirty unit apart-
ment building located on Ocean Front Walk in Venice, California. The
structure suffered from wall cracks, peeling paint, water leaks, heating
and electrical fixture problems, broken or inoperable windows, rodents
and cockroaches, and lack of sufficient heat in the apartments. The
tenants had complained in vain to the former owner and the resident
manager about the defective conditions of the building and of their
individual apartments. After the change in ownership, the tenants
again complained about the deficiencies to the manager, who had been
retained by the new owner. 3
The new landlord hired Western Investment Properties, Inc.
(WIP) to manage the property. On May 19, 1977, WIP notified the
tenants of substantial rent increases to take effect July 1, 1977. On May
26, 1977, Clara Breit, 4 representative of the building's tenant associa-
'9. Id at 54-55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
10. Id at 54 & n.5, 623 P.2d at 273 & n.5, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712 & n.5.
11. Id at 54-55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
12. Id at 59, 623 P.2d at 276, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
13. Id at 50, 623 P.2d at 270, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 709; see infra note 16.
14. Clara Breit, Maria Hallsthamnar and Cecelia DeCaprio were the appellants. All
appellants resided in the apartment building purchased by Knight.
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tion informed WIP that the tenants would withhold future rent pay-
ments because of the rent increase and the state of disrepair of the
building. WIP did not respond.15 In late May, however, WIP repre-
sented to the news media that repairs would be made to the common
areas and vacant apartments, but that occupied apartments would not
be renovated until vacated. 16
Between June second and August fifth, a Los Angeles County
health officer visited the premises five times and inspected a few apart-
ments. The health officer discovered seven code violations, which were
abated. 7 The building, however, had hot and cold water, adequate
sewage, and sound structural conditions. Therefore, it was not con-
denable under Los Angeles County Health Department standards.1
8
In early June, 1977, the tenants were served with three-day notices
to pay rent or quit. Unlawful detainer actions were commenced upon
non-compliance with the notices.19 The tenants raised the landlord's
breach of the implied warranty of habitability as a defense to the un-
15. At the trial, an agent of WIP acknowledged receipt of this letter. Id at 51, 623 P.2d
at 271, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
16. Knight had inspected the premises during escrow and noted certain needed improve-
ments. The new owners planned to renovate the common areas and the exterior and had in
fact begun repairs to the common areas. .d at 50, 623 P.2d at 270, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
The owners painted the front entrance and some of the hallway French doors and windows.
New carpeting was installed in the elevator, hallways and landings. Repairs were made to
hallways and the back stairway. In addition, the landlords refurbished vacant apartments
by repainting, recarpeting the living areas, placing new vinyls on kitchen and bathroom
floors, and in about five apartments, converting the bathtub to shower-tub combination. Id
at 61, 623 P.2d at 277, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (Clark, J., dissenting). A pest control company
was retained on a monthly basis, and an elevator maintenance service was hired to make
monthly checks. The resident manager installed a radiator in appellant Breit's apartment
after she complained that there was no heater. Id at 50-51, 623 P.2d at 270-71, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 709-10.
17. See supra note 16.
18. However, as the supreme court noted, the definition of "uninhabitable" used by the
health officer, ie., lack of any water, hot or cold, and extensive sewage leakage or structur-
ally unsound conditions, is the standard used to condemn a building and is not the standard
of habitability set forth in Gree4% Id at 51, 59 n.10, 623 P.2d at 271, 276 n.10, 171 Cal. Rptr.
at 710, 715 n.10; see supra note 2.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161(2) (West 1982) (tenant guilty of unlawful detainer
when he continues in possession of premises after default in payment of rent and after serv-
ice of three days' notice, in writing, requiring payment of amount due, or possession of
property); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1162 (West 1982) (manner of service of notice required
under section 1161(2)); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1164 (West 1982) (necessary parties to un-
lawful detainer proceeding); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1166 (West 1982) (necessary allega-
tions in a complaint for recovery of possession of premises); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1171
(West 1982) ("Whenever an issue of fact is presented by the pleadings, it must be tried by a
jury, unless such jury be waived as in other cases."); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1179a (West
1982) (precedence given to proceedings to recover possession of real property).
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lawful detainer actions.20 The jury returned a verdict for the landlord,
and the tenants appealed 2 on the ground that the trial court errone-
ously gave certain jury instructions requested by plaintiff, while refus-
ing to give others requested by defendants.22 The California Supreme
Court reversed the judgments entered against the tenants upon its de-
termination that "[tihe trial court's erroneous instructions to the jury
and failure to set forth properly the siandards of habitability were
20. See supra text accompanying note 5.
21. All appellants surrendered possession of the premises in question after the trial court
entered judgment for the landlords. The tenants appealed, and in April 1979, the appellate
department of the Los Angeles Superior Court reversed the trial court's decision on the basis
of erroneous jury instructions. Appellants' Petition for Hearing at 8, Knight v. Hallstham-
mar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 623 P.2d 268, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Petition for
Hearing]. On its own motion, the court of appeal ordered the matter transferred to it. Order
Transferring Action, Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 623 P.2d 623, 171 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1981). See CALIF. RULES OF COURT, RULES 62(a). In December, 1979, by a two-to-
one vote, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In January, 1980, a petition for
rehearing was denied and the tenants appealed to the California Supreme Court. Petition
for Hearing, supra, at 8.
22. The trial court instructed the jury, over the tenants' objection, that a tenant may not
defend an unlawful detainer action upon the basis of a landlord's breach of the implied
warranty of habitability unless 1) "It]he defective condition was unknown to the tenant at
the time of the occupancy of his or her apartment;" 2) "[t]he effect on habitability of the
defective condition [was not] apparent to the tenant upon a reasonable inspection;" and
3) the landlord was allowed a reasonable time to repair. 29 Cal. 3d at 54 & n.5, 623 P.2d at
273 & n.5, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712 & n.5. The tenants also objected to the reading of CAL. CIV.
CODE § 823 (West 1982), which provides:
Whatever remedies the lessee of any real property may have against his immediate
lessor, for the breach of any agreement in the lease, he may have against the as-
signs of the lessor, and the assigns of the lessee may have against the lessor and his
assigns, except upon covenants against incumbrances or relating to the title or pos-
session of the premises.
29 Cal. 3d at 55, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713. Lastly, the tenants objected to the
instructions that 1) a residence is uninhabitable if there is a "'materially defective condition
affecting habitability;' 2) the implied warranty of habitability relates to conditions which
affect the tenant's bare living requirements, and does not extend to what may be called
amenities; 3) amenities, as distinguished from living requirements, may include living with
lack of or unsightly painting, water leaks, wall cracks or defective or malfunctioning blinds;
and 4) minor housing code violations which do not affect habitability will not entitle the
tenant to a reduction in rent. Id at 57 n.8, 623 P.2d at 275 n.8, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.8.
The trial court refused the tenant's requested instruction that the landlord is the as-
signee of leases entered into between the former owners and the tenants; " '[tihat the effect of
the assignment is to transfer the interest of the former owners in the leased property to the
new landlord,"' that the landlord stands "'in the shoes of the former owners, taking their
rights and remedies, subject to any.defenses which the [tenants] had prior to the notice of
assignment' "; and that the landlord "'can gain no better position than the former owners
had with respect to the subject matter of the assignment."' Id at 55-56, 623 P.2d at 274, 171
Cal. Rptr. at 713. The trial court also refused any instructions which purported to list the
specific housing requirements of state or local law as contained in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1
(West Supp. 1981), the Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE or the CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CODE. 29 Cal. 3d at 58, 623 P.2d at 275, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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likely to mislead the jury."23
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Status of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Prior to Knight
The Green decision approved the basic concept of an implied war-
ranty of habitability in residential leases.24 The Knight court, however,
was confronted with questions concerning the practical application of
the doctrine which were left unanswered by the Green court. Among
the unresolved issues were: 1) whether premises uninhabitable at the
inception of the lease were subject to the rule of implied warranty;
25
2) the parameters of the concept of "habitability";2 6 and 3) whether a
tenant could assert the landlord's breach of the warranty only if the
landlord had been notified of the defects and afforded a reasonable
opportunity to repair.27
The only case to expound upon the principles of the Green case
23. Id at 59, 623 P.2d at 276, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 715. It is interesting to note that at the
trial level, the court ordered the rent monies deposited into a trust account. Upon reversal of
the judgment entered against the tenants, the monies were returned to them. Telephone
interview (Sept. 24, 1981) with Ronald Rouda, attorney for the Knight appellants.
24. For an analysis of the Green decision, see Graham, The Greening of Tenants' Pas-
tures: Implied Warranty of Habitability, 49 CAL. STATE BAR J. 374 (1974); Moskovitz, The
Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1444 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Moskovitz]; Note, Implied Warranty of Habtability as a
Defense to Unlawful Detainer Actions, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 301 (1975); Note, The Great Green
Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 729 (1976).
25. The Green court avoided this issue because there were no allegations by either the
landlord or the tenant in that case that the premises were in an uninhabitable state when first
rented by the tenant. 10 Cal. 3d at 621 n.3, 517 P.2d at 1170-71 n.3, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07
n.3.
26. See supra note 2.
27. In Green, the landlord had notice of the conditions rendering the premises uninhab-
itable and failed to make repairs. 10 Cal. 3d at 620-21, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at
706.
The Green court also left unanswered the question of how damages were to be assessed,
Le., the method by which the rental value of the defective premises should be determined. It
recognized the difficulty of ascertaining damages and delegated to the trial courts the re-
sponsibility of using "all available facts to approximate the fair and reasonable damages
under all of the circumstances." Id at 638-39, 517 P.2d at 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The
court in Knight did not address the issue of damages. For an overview of the various
methods of computing damages see Myers, Implied Warranty of Habitability, 4 L.A. LAW.
34, 41-42 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Myers]. For an analysis of the measurement of dam-
ages for breach of the warranty see Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties
ofHabitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Statuis, 16 URB. LAW ANN. 3, 102-09
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Cunningham]; HIRSCH, HIRSCH & MARGOLIS, Regression Analy-
st of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation of the Ackerman-
Komesar.Debate, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1098, 1110 n.50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hirsch].
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was the court of appeal decision in Quevedo v. Braga." Quevedo lim-
ited tenants' use of the implied warranty of habitability, and estab-
lished a basis for tenants' waiver of the warranty, by requiring that a
tenant's affirmative cause of action for breach of the warranty allege
that: 1) a materially defective condition affecting habitability exists;
2) the defective condition was unknown to the tenant at the time of
occupancy; 3) the effect on habitability of the defective condition was
not apparent upon a reasonable inspection; 4) notice was given to the
landlord within a reasonable time after tenant discovered or should
have discovered the breach; and 5) the landlord was given a reasonable
time to correct the defect while the tenant remained in possession.29
Quevedo, by formulating these restrictive prerequisites, obfuscated
the rationale underlying the recognition of the implied warranty of
habitability.30 In Knight, however, the California Supreme Court re-
turned to the public policy considerations of Green and resolved the
difficulties created by the court of appeal in Quevedo.
B Waiver of the Warranty of Habitability
The first issue addressed by the Knight court was whether a resi-
dential tenant who continues to occupy uninhabitable premises after
learning of defects waives the landlord's breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability.31 The court bifurcated the waiver issue as fol-
lows: 1) the tenant's awareness of defects (whether at the inception of
the lease or at any time during the lease term);3 2 and 2) a new tenant's
failure to discover defects upon a reasonable inspection.33
The Knight court, as did the Green court, identified the policy con-
siderations underlying the implied warranty of habitability as housing
shortage, the inequality of bargaining power between landlord and ten-
ant, and the impracticability of imposing a duty of inspection upon ten-
ants.3 4 In Green, the court stated that "public policy requires that
landlords generally not be permitted to use their superior bargaining
28. 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 140 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1977).
29. Id at 7-8, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
30. See supra note 4.
31. 29 Cal. 3d at 51, 623 P.2d at 271, 171,Cal. Rptr. at 710.
32. Id at 51, 54, 623 P.2d at 271, 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 710, 712.
33. Id at 54 & n.5, 623 P.2d at 273 & n.5, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712 & n.5.
34. 29 Cal. 3d at 52-53, 54, 623 P.2d at 271-72, 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11, 712; see
Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 624-25, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709. For a further discussion
of the contemporary landlord-tenant relationship underlying these considerations see Clock-
sin, Consumer Problems in the Landlord-Tenant Relationshi, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
572, 572 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clocksin]; Love, Landlord's Liabiliyfor Defective Prem-
ises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liabiliy, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19, 98-100 [hereinafter
[Vol. 15
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power to negate the warranty of habitability.""5 While disapproving
generally of a compelled waiver of the implied warranty, the Green
court did not decide whether a tenant's occupancy of uninhabitable
premises at the commencement of the lease term constitutes a waiver of
the warranty.36 The Knight court held that the policy considerations
underlying the imposition of the warranty compel the conclusion that
"a tenant's lack of knowledge of defects is not a prerequisite to the
landlord's breach of the warranty.
37
The Knight court also rejected a waiver of the implied warranty of
habitability based on a tenant's failure to inspect the premises, reason-
ing that prospective tenants are under no duty to inspect a residence for
defects which may render it uninhabitable. 38 In Green, the court rea-
soned that "the increasing complexity of modem apartment buildings
... makes adequate inspection of the premises. . . a virtual impossi-
bility; complex heating, electrical and plumbing systems are hidden
from view, and the landlord. . . is certainly in a much better position
to discover. . . dilapidations. . . ,"9 According to the Knight court,
it was inconsistent to recognize the impracticability of the tenant con-
ducting an adequate inspection of the premises to discover defects,
while simultaneously imposing on the tenant a duty of inspection.4°
The Knight court recognized that California's statutory pattern of
landlord-tenant relations is consistent with the policy of prohibiting
waiver of the warranty.4 1 Under Civil Code section 1941,42 a landlord
is obligated to put a building in a condition fit for human occupation
cited as Love]; Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Dream Deferred, 48 U.
Mo. KANSAS Crrv L. REv. 237, 238-40 (1980); see also sources cited supra note 4.
35. 10 Cal. 3d at 625 n.9, 517 P.2d at 1173-74 n.9, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10 n.9.
36. Id at 621 n.3, 517 P.2d at 1170-71 n.3, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07 n.3.
37. 29 Cal. 3d at 54, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
38. Id at 54 n.5, 623 P.2d at 273 n.5, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.5.
39. 10 Cal. 3d at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
40. 29 Cal. 3d at 54 n.5, 623 P.2d at 273 n.5, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.5.
41. Id at 53, 623 P.2d at 272, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 711. For a discussion of the statutes
governing landlord relations see Hirsch, supra note 27, at 1102-06; Comment, Rent With-
holding Won't Work The Needfor a Realistic Rehabilitation Policy, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 66
(1974); Comment, Landlord and Tenant: Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 298 (1971); Comment, Caijfornia's New Legislation on a Landlord's Duty to Repair -
Legal Problems of Landlord and Tenant, 3 U.C.D. L. REv. 131 (1971).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1954) provides:
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such occupa-
tion, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenantable,
except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and twenty-nine.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1929 (West 1954) provides that "[tihe hirer of a thing must repair all
deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned by his want of ordinary care."
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and to repair subsequent dilapidations rendering it untenantable.43
Civil Code section 1942" authorizes a tenant to repair untenantable
43. 29 Cal. 3d at 53, 623 P.2d at 272, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 711. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941.1
(West Supp. 1982) provides:
A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable for purposes of Section 1941 if it sub-
stantially lacks any of the following affirmative standard characteristics:
(a) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior walls, in-
cluding unbroken windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing or gas facilities which conformed to applicable law in effect at the
time of installation, maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is under the control of
the tenant, capable of producing hot and cold running water, or a system which is
under the control of the landlord, which produces hot and cold running water,
furnished to appropriate fixtures, and connected to a sewage disposal system ap-
proved under applicable law.
(d) Heating facilities which conformed with applicable law at the time of installa-
tion, maintained in good working order.
(e) Electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment which conformed
with applicable law at the time of installation, maintained in good working order.
(f) Building, grounds and appurtenances at the time of the commencement of the
lease or rental agreement in every part clean, sanitary, and free from all accumula-
tion of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin, and all areas under the
control of the landlord kept in every part clean, sanitary, and free from all accumu-
lations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin.
(g) An adequate number of appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish, in
clean condition and good repair at the time of the commencement of the lease or
rental agreement, with the landlord providing appropriate serviceable receptacles
thereafter, and being responsible for the clean condition and good repair of such
receptacles under his control.
(h) Floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair.
Affirmative obligations are .imposed on a tenant by CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.2 (West Supp.
1982), which provides:
(a) No duty on the part of the landlord to repair a dilapidation shall arise under
Section 1941 or 1942 if the tenant is in substantial violation of any of the following
affirmative obligations, provided the tenant's violation contributes substantially to
the existence of the dilapidation or interferes substantially with the landlord's obli-
gation under Section 1941 to effect the necessary repairs:
(I) To keep that part of the premises which he occupies and uses clean and
sanitary as the condition of the premises permits.
(2) To dispose from his dwelling unit all rubbish, garbage and other waste,
in a clean and sanitary manner.
(3) To properly use and operate all electrical, gas and plumbing fixtures and
keep them as clean and sanitary as their condition permits.
(4) Not to permit any person on the premises, with his permission, to will-
fully or wantonly destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the struc-
ture or dwelling unit or the facilities, equipment, or appurtenances thereto, nor
himself do any such thing.
(5) To occupy the premises as his abode, utilizing portions thereof for living,
sleeping, cooking or dining purposes only which were respectively designed or in-
tended to be used for such occupancies.
(b) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) shall not apply if the landlord has
expressly agreed in writing to perform the act or acts mentioned therein.
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1982) provides:
(a) If within a reasonable time after written or oral notice to the landlord. . . of
dilapidations rendering the premises untenantable which the landlord ought to re-
pair, the landlord neglects to do so, the tenant may repair. . . where the cost of
such repairs does not require an expenditure more than one month's rent. . . and
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premises if the landlord fails to do so after notice, and to deduct the
cost of repairs from the monthly rent due.' Civil Code section
1942. 146 voids as contrary to public policy any agreement by a lessee
purporting to waive or modify his or her rights under sections 1941 or
1942 with respect to any condition which renders the premises unten-
antable, except that the lessor and lessee may agree that the lessee shall
be responsible for repair as part of the consideration for the rental.47 In
Knight, there was no agreement requiring the tenants to repair the
48premises.
Based on the policy considerations underlying the implied war-
ranty of habitability, and bolstered by California's statutory scheme in
the area of landlord-tenant relations,49 the court concluded that the
duty of the landlord to maintain habitable premises5" was not depen-
deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent when due, .... This remedy
shall not be available to the tenant more than twice in any 12-month period.
(b) For the purposes of this section, if a tenant acts to repair and deduct after the
30th day following notice, he is presumed to have acted after a reasonable
time ...
(c) The tenant's remedy under subdivision (a) shall not be available if the condi-
tion was caused by a violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.
(d) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other remedy pro-
vided by this chapter, the rental agreement, or other applicable statutory or com-
mon law.
45. The court noted that the statutory remedy of "repair and deduct" is only available
twice in any twelve-month period, and that to invoke the remedy the tenant has to adhere to
certain procedural requirements. 29 Cal. 3d at 53, 623 P.2d at 272, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
See supra note 44. The court further emphasized that the remedy provided by § 1942 was
not the exclusive remedy for tenants when a landlord neglected to maintain tenantable
premises. 29 Cal. 3d at 53, 623 P.2d at 272, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 711. In Green, and Secretary of
HUD v. Layfield, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 152 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1978), the courts stated that
the enactment of section 1942 does not preclude the recognition of a common law warranty
of habitability, and that the "repair and deduct" provisions are not an exclusive remedy. 10
Cal. 3d at 620, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706; 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 30, 152 Cal.
Rptr. at 344. In 1979, § 1942 was amended to provide explicitly that the remedy of that
section is in addition to "any other remedy provided by. . . applicable. . . common law."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942(d) (West Supp. 1982). It appears that the Knight court was stating
that the tenants did not waive the implied warranty of habitability by failing to comply with
the provisions of § 1942.
46. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942.1 (West Supp. 1981).
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.1 (West Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part that "the
lessor and the lessee may agree that the lessee shall undertake to improve, repair or maintain
all or stipulated portions of the dwelling as part of the consideration for rental."
48. 29 Cal. 3d at 54, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
49. In Green, the California Supreme Court recognized the interrelation of the develop-
ment of the common law doctrine of an implied warranty of habitability and legislative
policy concerning housing standards. 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at
711.
50. Id The term "habitable" is more comprehensive than the term "tenantable." 'ren-
antable" is the legal definition of habitability for purposes of Civil Code §§ 1941-1942, in-
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dent upon the tenant's lack of awareness of specific defects l.5 Accord-
ingly, the tenants in Knight did not waive the landlord's implied
warranty of habitability despite their possible failure to inspect the
premises prior to occupancy, 52 and despite their continued occupancy
in an uninhabitable dwelling.
C. Reasonable Time to Repair
The Knight court next considered whether the landlord's breach of
the implied warranty of habitability arises only after the landlord is
allowed a reasonable time to repair the defect while the tenant remains
in possession. The Knight court, quoting the Massachusetts case of
Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson,5 3 declared that "'It]he landlord's lack
of fault and reasonable efforts to repair do not prolong the duty to pay
full rent.' ,, The Knight court stated that "it is significant" that Cali-
fornia law imposes a duty on a lessor "to put a building into a condi-
tion fit for occupation and to repair all later defects which make the
premises uninhabitable. ' 5 The court further stated that the mutual
dependence of a landlord's obligation to maintain habitable premises,
and a tenant's duty to pay rent would be meaningless if the breach of
the warranty did not arise until the landlord had been allowed a rea-
sonable time to repair defects.5 6 Accordingly, the court held that in a
elusive. Comment, California's New Legislation of a Landlord's Duty to Repair - Legal
Problems of Landlord and Tenant, 3 U.C.D. L. REv. 131, 143 (1971). Reference to habitable
premises for purposes of the implied warranty of habitability encompasses the judicially
mandated standards for habitability, and may include those conditions that render a dwell-
ing "tenantable." Id at 146-47. See also 29 Cal. 3d at 57-59, 623 P.2d at 275-76, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 714-15.
51. 29 Cal. 3d at 54, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
52. The Knight opinion does not state whether the tenants had inspected the premises
prior to occupancy. Apparently the tenants had resided in the apartment building for some
time prior to the change in ownership, and all of the defective conditions existed before the
new landlord acquired ownership. Id at 50, 623 P.2d at 270, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
53. 396 N.E.2d 981 (Mass. 1979).
54. 29 Cal. 3d at 54, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712 (quoting Berman & Sons, Inc.
v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d at 983). The Berman court defined the implied warranty of habita-
bility as a landlord's covenant that, at the inception of the lease and for its entire term, the
premises are and will remain free of defects in facilities "vital to the use of the premises for
residential purposes." Id at 985 (citations omitted). The Berman court further held that the
tenant's obligation to pay full rent abated "as soon as the landlord has notice that the prem-
ises failed to comply with the requirements of the warranty of habitability." Id at 983.
55. 29 Cal. 3d at 55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712; Cal. Civ. Code § 1941 (West
1954); see supra note 19.
56. 29 Cal. 3d at 55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712. In Green, the court held that
"the tenant's duty to pay rent is 'mutually dependent' upon the landlord's fulfillment of his
implied warranty of habitability." 10 Cal. 3d at 635, 517 P.2d at 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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situation where a landlord has notice of uninhabitable conditions,5 7 not
caused by the tenants, a breach of the implied warranty of habitability
exists whether or not the landlord has had a reasonable time to repair.58
. Change of Ownership
The Knight court next addressed whether it was error for the trial
judge to read section 823 of the Civil Code to the jury.59 Section 823
prohibits a lessee from asserting against the lessor's assigns any ripened
chose in action arising from the lessor's breach of a covenant against
encumbrances or relating to the title or possession of the premises. A
lessee's assigns are likewise prohibited from asserting such a cause of
57. In Knight, the tenants withheld rent after notifying the landlord of the defects ren-
dering the premises uninhabitable. 29 Cal. 3d at 50, 623 P.2d at 270, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
The jury instruction regarding notice was not challenged on appeal, and, therefore, the
Knight court did not consider the issue of notice as a prerequisite to a tenant's assertion of a
landlord's breach of the warranty. Id at 55 n.6, 623 P.2d at 273 n.6, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712
n.6.
58. Id at 55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712. The Knight court disapproved
Quevedo and Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972), to the extent
that both decisions held that a tenant could not assert the landlord's breach of the implied
warranty of habitability if the landlord had not been allowed a reasonable time to repair
defects. 29 Cal. 3d at 55 n.7, 623 P.2d at 273 n.7, 171 CaL Rptr. at 712 n.7; Quevedo v.
Braga, 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 7, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 147; Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d at
70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Hinson was an action by a tenant seeking to enjoin the filing of an eviction action based
on nonpayment of rent and praying for a declaratory judgment to the effect that the tenant
was not obligated to pay full rent until the landlord complied with his duty substantially to
obey the housing codes. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 65, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 663. The court of appeal
held that there was an implied warranty of habitability for residential leases and upheld the
tenant's right to claim a rent abatement if the warranty were breached. Id at 70-71, 102 Cal.
Rptr. at 666. The Hinson court held that:
In considering the materiality of an alleged breach, both the seriousness of the
claimed defect and the length of time for which it persists are relevant factors ...
[Tihe violation must be relevant and affect the tenant's apartment or the common
areas which he uses. ... The tenant must also give notice of alleged defects to the
landlord and allow a reasonable time for repairs to be made.
Id at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666. The Hinson court did not expressly state why it required
time to repair.
Both Hinson and Quevedo were actions instituted by the tenant, whereas Knight was a
summary eviction proceeding. The requirement of reasonable opportunity to repair was
eliminated as an element of the claim of a breach of the implied warranty of habitability,
whether asserted as a defense to an unlawful detainer action or as an affirmative action
against a landlord for damages. In Knight, the court declared that "a landlord's breach of
the implied warranty of habitability exists whether or not he has a 'reasonable' time to re-
pair." 29 Cal. 3d at 55, 629 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712. The court did not distinguish
between the two procedures for alleging the breach of warranty.
59. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 823 (West 1982). See supra note 22.
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action against the lessor or the lessor's assignees. 60 The court framed
the issue as "whether a residential tenant may defend an unlawful de-
tainer action brought by a current landlord based on uninhabitable
conditions which have existed since the tenant entered possession
under a former owner."61 The tenants requested an instruction that a
successor landlord should be held liable for a previous owner's breach
of the implied warranty of habitability.62 The trial court refused to
proffer this instruction.63
Both the landlord and the tenants relied on the supreme court's
language in Standard Livestock v. Pentt to support their conflicting
contentions concerning the applicability of section 823 to the Knight
case. In StandardLivestock, the assignee of the original lessee sued the
lessor for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, 65 alleging
that the covenant was breached when a mortgagee of the property com-
menced a foreclosure action.66 The foreclosure action was filed after
the assignment of the lease.67 The lessor in Standard Livestock argued
that section 823 barred the assignee from asserting the action because
he was not the original lessee.68 The court held that section 823 related
to remedies as distinguished from rights,69 and that the assignee of a
lease acquired the right to the enforcement of any unbroken covenant
contained in the lease. The assigment, however, did not transfer to
the assignee those ripened choses in action for a breach of the covenant
against encumbrances or relating to the title or possession of the
premises.70
The Knight court, without detailed analysis, held that the interpre-
tation of section 823 contained in Standard Livestock was inapplicable
under the facts of the case. 71 The court stated that the successor land-
60. Knight is a case of first impression regarding the applicability of Civil Code § 823 to
the implied warranty of habitability.
61. 29 Cal. 3d at 55, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
62. Id at 55-56, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
63. Id The court did not explain the trial court's refusal of the tenants' requested
instruction.
64. 204 Cal. 618, 269 P. 645 (1928); see infra text accompanying notes 70, 167.
65. 204 Cal. at 620-21, 269 P. at 646.
66. Id at 621, 269 P. at 646.
67. Id
68. Id at 629, 269 P. at 649.
69. Id
70. Id; see infra text accompanying note 167.
71. 29 Cal. 3d at 56, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The Knight court noted that
the tenants did not cross-complain against the new owner for damages caused by a previous
owner, nor did they seek retroactive rent reductions for any period before the change of
ownership. Id at 56-57, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The court therefore deemed
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lord was in breach of the implied warranty of habitability, if the prem-
ises were in fact uninhabitable. 72 "Moreover, the change in ownership
was an event over which the tenants had no control."
73
The dissent in Knight concluded that the reading of Civil Code
section 823 in its entirety was not improper because the instruction
stated a valid principle of law.74 The dissenting opinion further stated
that the tenants did not request additional instructions explaining the
applicability of the code section language to the case.75 The tenants,
however, had requested an instruction stating that the assignment of
the lease transferred to the new landlord the interest of the former own-
ers in the leased premises; and the landlord acquired the rights and
remedies of the former owners, subject to any defenses available to the
tenants prior to the assignment.76
The court concluded that a tenant may defend an unlawful de-
tainer action against a successor owner, at least with respect to rent
claimed due since the time the new owner acquired possession, despite
the existence of the uninhabitable conditions under a former owner.77
Because the jury could have inferred from the trial court's instruction
that the tenants had no defense against the landlord if the premises
were uninhabitable prior to the change in ownership, the supreme court
held that it was error to offer section 823 as a jury instruction.78
E. Dfnition of Habitability
The final issue considered by the court in Knight was the definition
of habitability. The trial court spoke of a "materially defective condi-
tion affecting habitability," and generally distinguished between bare
it unnecessary to decide whether the "applicability of Civil Code section 823 to a tenant's
affirmative action against a new owner, or whether the implied warranty of habitability is
'an agreement in the lease' or a covenant 'relating to... possession of the premises' within
the meaning of that section." Id at 57, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The court also
did not consider the tenants' contention that the products liability exception to the general
rule against imposing liabilities of a predecessor corporation upon its successor is applicable
in landlord-tenant cases. Id at 57, 623 P.2d at 274-75, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14; see Ray v.
Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). For a discussion of prod-
ucts liability and the landlord-tenant relationship see Note, Products Liabiliy at the Thresh-
old of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGs LJ. 458 (1970).
72. 29 Cal. 3d at 57, 623 P.2d at 275, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
73. Id
74. 29 Cal. 3d at 68, 623 P.2d at 281, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (Clark, J., dissenting).
75. Id (Clark, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 55-56, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
77. Id at 57, 623 P.2d at 275, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
78. Id
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living requirements and amenities,79 but refused instructions which
enumerated the specific housing requirements of state or local law, as
contained in Civil Code section 1941.1.80
Without evaluating the propriety of each item contained in the
tenants' requested instruction, the Knight court ruled that depending
upon the facts of the case, the standards contained in section 1941.1
may be relevant to a determination of habitability.8 The supreme
court rejected the landlord's argument that the standards set forth in
section 1941.1 were inapplicable because the tenants claimed a breach
of the implied warranty of habitability rather than invoking the "re-
pair-and-deduct" remedy provided in Civil Code section 1942.82 The
court reasoned that: 1) section 1941.1 defines untenantable standards
for purposes of section 1941; 2) section 1941 imposes on landlords the
duty to maintain tenantable premises; and 3) the language of section
1941 does not demonstrate a legislative intent to vary the duty of a
landlord depending upon whether a tenant relies on the statutory rem-
edy of "repair-and-deduct" or on the common law implied warranty of
habitability.
83
While the Knight court declined to set forth a complete definition
of uninhabitable conditions, it noted various standards relevant to a
determination of a premises' habitability. s4 The court indicated that,
depending on the particular facts of the case, a landlord's noncompli-
ance with applicable building and housing codes may or may not con-
stitute a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.8" In some cases,
housing code violations are not dispositive of whether the landlord has
breached the warranty.8 6 The Knight court, however, did not establish
precise rules for defining uninhabitable premises.
79. As instructed by the trial court, in some situations amenities include living with lack
of or unsightly paint, water leaks, wall cracks or defective or malfunctioning venetian blinds.
The court further instructed that minor housing code violations which do not affect habita-
bility would not entitle the tenant to a rent reduction. Id at 57 n.8, 623 P.2d at 275 n.8, 171
Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.8.
80. Id at 58, 623 P.2d at 275, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714; see supra note 43 for the text of
§ 1941.1.
81. 29 Cal. 3d at 58, 623 P.2d at 276, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
82. Id at 58, 623 P.2d at 275-76, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15; see supra note 44.
83. Id at 58-59, 623 P.2d at 276, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
84. Id at 59 n.10, 623 P.2d at 276 n.10, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 715 n.l0 (citations omitted); see
Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d qt 637, 517 P.2d at 1182-83, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.





Although a majority of jurisdictions has recognized an implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases,87 there is no unanimity
among courts concerning the nature and scope of the warranty.8 8 This
section will compare the majority opinion in Knight with the more re-
strictive view of the implied warranty of habitability set forth by the
Knight dissent.
A. Waiver of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
1. The argument supporting waiver
The dissent in Knight maintained that the implied warranty of
habitability may be waived in appropriate circumstances.89 A tenant
who is aware of specific deficiencies at the inception of the tenancy can
entertain no reasonable expectation that the premises will be habitable
for the duration of the lease, absent a landlord's expressed intention to
effect repairs or improvements.9" The dissent's major premise was that
when a tenant who is aware of defects occupies an apartment without
complaint, he or she has demonstrated a willingness to endure the de-
fects either in exchange for the agreed rent,91 or because the defects do
not render the premises uninhabitable.92
A rigid rule prohibiting waiver of the implied warranty of habita-
bility, according to the dissent, fails to effect the intentions of the par-
87. See supra note 4. Alabama is one of the few states that has not recognized the im-
plied warranty of habitability. See Martin v. Springdale Stores, Inc., 354 So. 2d 1144, 1145-
46 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) ("As between the landlord and tenant, where there is no fraud, false
representations or knowing concealment of defects, there is no implied covenant or warranty
that the premises are suitable for occupation. .. .
88. Love, supra note 34, at 101.
89. 29 Cal. 3d at 65, 623 P.2d at 280, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (Clark, J., dissenting). Sev-
eral jurisdictions have held that the warranty of habitability can be waived. Eg., Mease v.
Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791,797 (Iowa 1972) (a tenant can voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
waive defects constituting a breach of warranty); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 464, 470,
308 A.2d 17, 19, 22 (1973) (although court held that tenant did not waive warranty by con-
tinuing in possession of defective premises, court acknowledged that warranty could be
waived - court did not specify conditions under which a waiver would be found); Kline v.
Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 93, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971) (whether a tenant had waived warranty of
habitability was listed as a factor in determining a breach of warranty, but court did not
specify manner in which a waiver could occur).
90. 29 Cal. 3d at 65, 623 P.2d at 279-80, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (Clark, J., dissenting).
91. The assumption of the dissenting opinion was that in the free market, the primary
determinant of the agreed rent is the physical condition of the premises. Id at 64, 623 P.2d
at 279, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (Clark, J., dissenting).
92. Id at 66, 623 P.2d at 280, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Clark, J., dissenting). In support of
this position, see Morris v. Jones, 128 Ga. App. 847, 847-48, 198 S.E.2d 354, 355 (1973)
(Georgia Court of Appeals held that tenant's occupancy of premises proved habitability).
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ties to a lease.93 The landlord and tenant freely bargain to lease the
premises in a condition commensurate with the agreed rent.94 A tenant
should not thereafter be permitted to require a landlord to provide im-
proved property without renegotiating the rental.9 Nor should a ten-
ant who knowingly occupies defective premises be allowed to withhold
rent and then defend an unlawful detainer action on the basis of the
landlord's breach of the implied warranty.
96
In addition, the dissent argued that imposing a nonwaivable duty
on landlords to provide habitable premises will not ensure improved
housing conditions. 97 The categories of housing which will be affected
by the covenant of habitability range from those dwellings suffering
from minor defects to completely dilapidated housing.9 If it is as-
sumed that landlords, as rational economic beings, seek to maximize
profits and minimize losses, 99 the economic consequences of the im-
plied warranty of habitability are likely to be as follows:
1. Some substandard housing would be upgraded and rents in-
93. 29 Cal. 3d at 64-65, 623 P.2d at 279-80, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (Clark, J., dissenting).
See also Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L.
Rv. 879, 884 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Meyers].
94. 29 Cal. 3d at 64, 623 P.2d at 279, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (Clark, J., dissenting). The
state of Maine will enforce a waiver if there is a written agreement between the landlord and
tenant waiving the warranty of habitability in exchange for a stated reduction in rent or
other specified fair consideration. The Maine statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
5. Waiver. A written agreement whereby the tenant accepts specified conditions
which may violate the warranty of fitness for human habitation in return for a
stated reduction in rent or other specified fair consideration shall be binding on the
tenant and the landlord.
Any agreement, other than as provided in this subsection, by a tenant to waive any
of the rights or benefits provided by this section shall be void.
M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021(5) (West 1980).
95. See 29 Cal. 3d at 64, 623 P.2d at 279, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (Clark, J., dissenting).
96. Id (Clark, J., dissenting).
97. Cf. id at 62-63 n.3, 623 P.2d at 278 n.3, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 717 n.3 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing) ("Enforcement of the implied warranty does not increase the supply of rental housing.
If anything, the result will be that some landlords faced with substantial costs in complying
with the warranty will tear down their buildings."). See also Meyers, supra note 93, at 881.
Meyers states:
[Tihough housing may be in short supply and though tenants may be poor and
landlords rich, the duty of habitability may not change the bargaining position of
tenants or improve the condition of rental housing. Whether or not it will do so
depends on other considerations, primarily the rents that can be collected and the
cost of repairs. . . . Mhe . . . rationale for the habitability duty is based on
moral philosophy and distributive justice, but the objectives it seeks to achieve
cannot be accomplished outside the narrow and perhaps selfish confines of eco-
nomic behavior.
Id
98. See generallv Meyers, supra note 93, at 889.
99. Id at 893.
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creased. Tenants would either be forced out or required to pay higher
rent. Those tenants unable or unwilling to pay for the improved hous-
ing would move out, creating an increased demand for low-priced,
lower-quality housing."°°
2. Some landlords would be able to repair without incurring a
deficit and without raising rents. Tenants would enjoy better housing
at no extra cost. The warranty of habitability would, however, retire
this component of the housing stock sooner than would otherwise be
the case and would discourage new investment in low-rent housing.'
3. Some portion of the housing stock would be abandoned as
soon as the owner determines that income would not cover the ex-
penses of repairs and that a deficit would persist."0 2 Thus, if a waiver of
the warranty of habitability is not implied from a tenant voluntarily
choosing to live in lower-cost, lower-quality housing, 1 3 enforcement of
the warranty could deleteriously affect the housing market and the situ-
ation of the lower-income tenant.1 4
In support of its position on the waiver issue, the Knight dissent
also relied on the Green court's analogy'05 to the implied warranty of
fitness and merchantability in the sale of goods.'06 The Green court
had stated that "[i]n seeking to protect the reasonable expectations of
consumers, judicial decisions, discarding the caveat emptor approach,
have.., implied a warranty of fitness and merchantability in the case
of the sale of goods."'0 7 In the dissent's view, Green supported a
waiver of the warranty of habitability where the circumstances indicate
a tenant's intent to waive the implied warranty.10 8 In the sale of goods,
the implied warranties are disclaimed When the goods are accepted "as
100. Id; see also Rose, supra note 4, at 73.
101. Meyers, supra note 93, at 893.
102. Id Abandonment may be more prevalent among sole proprietors who lack ade-
quate resources to effect necessary repairs. See Grigsby, Economic Aspects of Housing Code
Enforcement, 3 URB. LAW. 533, 535 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Grigsby]; Comment, Land-
lord-Tenant Law Reform - Implied Warranty ofHabitabiliy.- Effects and Effectiveness of Rem-
edies for Its Breach, 5 TEx. TECH. L. Rnv. 749, 768 (1974).
103. Contra infra text accompanying notes 127-29.
104. See supora text accompanying notes 100-02. The appropriateness of judicial interven-
tion in the area of landlord-tenant relations for the purpose of improving housing co.nditions
can also be questioned. Meyers, supra note 93, at 897; Parker, Must the ResidentialLandlord
Runfor Cover?, 6 REAL EsT. RIv. 76, 76 (1976). Meyers argues that the responsibilities
imposed on the courts and litigants could prove insurmountable. Meyers, supra note 93, at
886-89.
105. 29 Cal. 3d at 65, 623 P.2d at 280, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Clark, J., dissenting).
106. CAL. U. COM. CODE §§ 2314(1), 2315 (West 1964).
107. 10 Cal. 3d at 626, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
108. 29 Cal. 3d at 65, 623 P.2d at 279-80, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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is" and "with all faults."' 9 The payment of rent by the Knight tenants
in the face of alleged defective conditions was equivalent to an expres-
sion of "acceptance" of the premises' shortcomings. 110
2. The argument against waiver
Balanced against the arguments for waiver are the policy consider-
ations underlying the recognition of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. These policy considerations led to the rejection of waivers in the
Washington case, Folsy v. Wyman,"' and in the Pennsylvania case,
Fair v. Negley.
112
The tenant in Foisy bargained for reduced rent due to the exist-
ence of defects in the residence.' 13 The court concluded that tenants
seek housing suitable for occupation; the tenant's promise to pay rent is
in exchange for the landlord's promise to provide a habitable dwell-
ing.114 The Foisy court ruled that bargaining for a rent reduction for
defective premises is contrary to the purpose of the implied warranty of
habitability." 5
In Fair,"I6 the rental agreement contained a clause stating that the
premises were taken "as is.""' 7 In addition, the tenant expressly ac-
knowledged that the roof leaked.'11 The trial court ruled on the "as is"
clause based on section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.)," 9 and found that the warranty of habitability had been
waived because the premises were rented "as is."' 20
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, did not find the lan-
109. CAL. COM. CODE § 2316(3)(a) (West 1964); 2 B. WrrxIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Sales, §§ 76-78, at 1146-47 (8th ed. 1973).
110. 29 Cal. 3d at 64, 623 P.2d at 279, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (Clark, J., dissenting).
111. 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
112. 257 Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1978).
113. 83 Wash. 2d at 24, 515 P.2d at 164.
114. Id at 27, 515 P.2d at 164.
115. Id The defects noted by the Folsy court included lack of heat, no hot water tank,
broken windows, a broken door, water running through the bedroom, an improperly seated
and leaking toilet, a leaking sink in the bathroom, broken water pipes in the yard and ter-
mites in the basement. Id at 24-25, 515 P.2d at 162. The court stated that "[a] disadvan-
taged tenant should not be placed in a position of agreeing to live in an uninhabitable
premises. Housing conditions, such as the record indicates exist in the instant case, are a
health hazard, not only to the individual tenant, but to the community which is exposed to
said individual." Id at 28, 515 P.2d at 164.
116. 257 Pa. Super. 50, 390 A.2d 240 (1973).
117. Id at 53, 390 A.2d at 242.
118. Id
119. d at 55, 390 A.2d at 243; see supra text accompanying note 109.
120. 257 Pa. Super. at 55, 390 A.2d at 243.
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guage of the U.C.C. controlling in the area of landlord-tenant law. 121
The court observed that dilapidated housing contributed to such
problems as urban blight and juvenile delinquency122 and imperiled
public health and safety.123 Accordingly, the Fair court held that a
waiver was contrary to the policy underlying the warranty of habitabil-
ity.' 24 The court invalidated the negotiation between the landlord and
tenant for rental of defective premises, 2 and concluded that the war-
ranty of habitability could not be waived.
26
The arguments supporting waiver of the warranty of habitability
assume that any waiver is voluntary. 7 The rebuttal argument is that
the inequality of bargaining power in a tight housing market practically
eliminates the tenant's power to secure favorable terms in a lease agree-
ment.12  The common law assumption that a tenant can bargain for an
express warranty of habitability is unrealistic. 29 The modem tenant
relies on the landlord's implied representation that the premises are fit
121. Id The court noted that if it were to find U.C.C § 2-316 controlling, U.C.C § 2-302,
which states that a court may limit the application of any unconscionable clause of a con-
tract to avoid an unjust result, would also be controlling. Id at 55 n.1, 390 A.2d at 243 n.l.
The "as is" clause would be unconscionable and the waiver of the warranty ineffective. Id
The emphasis on the analogy of residential leases to consumer contracts does not negate
the uniqueness and increased complexity of residential leases. Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond
URLT,4:,4 JrogramforAchieving Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REv. 1, 27
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Blumberg & Robbins].
122. 257 Pa. Super. at 56, 390 A.2d at 243 (citing Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596,
111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961)).
123. 257 Pa. Super. at 56-57, 390 A.2d at 244.
124. 1d at 56, 59, 390 A.2d at 243, 245. The factors identified by the Fair court were:
(1) inability of tenants to adequately inspect or repair premises; (2) disparity of bargaining
power between landlord and tenant; (3) scarcity of housing; and (4) the effect of uninhabit-
able dwellings on public health and safety. Id at 55-56, 390 A.2d at 243.
125. Id at 60, 390 A.2d at 245.
126. Id On the issue of waiver, see generally Dutenhaver, Non-Waiver of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Residential Leases, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Dutenhaver].
127. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94, 103.
128. See Clocksin, supra note 34, at 572. The California Legislature has codified the
state's housing concerns. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50003 (West Supp. 1982) provides
in pertinent part:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that, .. there exists within the urban.
areas of the state a serious shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing which
persons and families of low or moderate income ... can afford. This situation
creates an absolute present and future shortage of supply in relation to demand, as
expressed in terms of housing needs and aspirations, and also creates inflation in
the cost of housing, by reason of its scarcity, which tends to decrease the relative
affordability of the state's housing supply for all its residents.
(b) To provide a decent home and suitable living environment for every Califor-
nia family is the basic housing goal of state government ....
129. See Love, supra note 34, at 100.
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for human habitation, and that the condition of the building will be
maintained. 130 Because tenants usually do not possess the necessary
skills to assume repairs, the capability of repairing, or the long term
interest in the property necessary to justify financing repairs,' 3' they
frequently have no realistic alternative but to accept defective premises
with the expectation that the landlord will make the necessary re-
pairs.'32 A tenant's acquiescence in defeitive conditions should there-
fore not be construed as a voluntary waiver of the implied warranty of
habitability.
133
In additiohi, nonapplication of the warranty at the inception of the
lease might encourage landlords to keep their premises in disrepair, so
that new tenants could not avail themselves of the implied warranty of
habitability doctrine. 34 This problem is avoided by recognizing that
because the warranty continues for the entire lease term, 35 the land-
lord's breach exists for as long as the defective conditions persist. Al-
though the tenants in Knight did not withhold rent until rents were
increased, the landlord's breach of the warranty was not thereby
waived; it was merely not asserted until summary eviction proceedings
were commenced.
Finally, the adverse economic impact of a rigid warranty of habit-
ability may not prove accurate. One study has concluded that: (1) ten-
ants' assertion of the breach of the implied warranty of habitability has
not been prevalent; 3 6 (2) the existence of the warranty is encouraging
130. Id
131. See Dutenhaver, supra note 126, at 46. Many defects require repair work that ex-
tends beyond the term of the tenant's right of possession in the premises. Id
132. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d at 625, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
133. Comment, Balancing the California Landlord-Tenant Relationsho, 9 CAL. W.L. REv.
326, 341 n. 16 (1973) (quoting Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor
Change, 54 GEO. U. 519, 527 (1966)).
134. Moskovitz, supra note 24, at 1449. The following cases adopted the implied war-
ranty to premises defective at the outset: Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17
(1973) (landlord's promise that premises are liveable arises at inception of lease and contin-
ues for duration of lease term); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 353 Mass. 184, 293
N.E.2d 831 (1973) (landlord promises to deliver and maintain demised premises in habitable
condition); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (tenant is implicitly or
expressly bargaining for immediate possession of premises in suitable condition); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) (residence must be in a condition reason-
ably and decently fit for occupation when lease term commences).
135. Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d at 52, 623 P.2d at 271, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 710
(quoting Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718).
136. Heskin, The Warrant of Habtablity Debate: A California Case Study, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 37, 55-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Heskin]. The language of Green was ambiguous,
making it difficult for attorneys to explain the law to their clients and to enforce it according
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landlords to make repairs; 137 (3) use of the warranty has not led to a
reduction in the supply of available housing;13 and (4) tenants who
remain in possession do not experience substantial increases in rent.
139
Housing conditions can be improved by enforcement of the implied
warranty of habitability. 1" The guidelines set forth in Knight may fa-
cilitate a greater utilization by tenants of the warranty 141 and provide
incentive for landlords to repair neglected property.142
B. The Notice Requirement
The majority in Knight held that if the premises are in fact unin-
habitable, the-landlord has breached the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity, whether or not the landlord has had an opportunity to repair.14
According to the dissent, however, the elements of a breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability include the requirement that the landlord
be given notice of the defects in the dwelling and a reasonable time to
repair them.144 The dissenting opinion premised this conclusion on the
holdings in Hinson145 and Quevedo14  that the tenant must fulfill cer-
tain requirements, including notice and reasonable time to repair, prior
to claiming a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. 47 The
to their clients' desires. Additionally, problems arose with defining "material breach" of
warranty and "materially affects health and safety." Heskin, Supra, at 59.
137. Id at 67.
138. Id
139. Id The study also concluded that tenants generally withhold rent in good faith and
that landlords have the ability to make the requested repairs. Id at 61; see also Hirsch,
supra note 27, at 1130-32.
140. Heskin, supra note 136, at 67. This author discovered no later study refuting Hes-
kin's findings.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
142. A limitation of the warranty of habitability, however, is its failure either to mandate
repairs of premises by the landlord or to enable the tenant to finance repairs. The economic
sanction of prospective rent abatement may or may not induce landlords to repair. Most
landlords will not repair where the capitalized cost of such repair is greater than the capital-
ized cost of continuing rent abatement. The available money damages and savings from
reduced rent will be insufficient to finance substantial repairs by tenants. Blumberg & Rob-
bins, supra note 121, at 11. A tenant's successful action for specific performance of the
warranty would effect repairs of defective conditions. See id at 30.
143. See supra note 12.
144. 29 Cal. 3d at 67, 623 P.2d at 280-81, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 719-20 (Clark, J., dissenting).
145. See supra note 58.
146. See supra text accompanying note 29.
147. 29 Cal. 3d at 66-67, 623 P.2d at 280-81, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 719-20 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing). Many jurisdictions have imposed the requirements of notice and reasonable time to
repair. E.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hem-
ingway, 363 Mass. 184,201,293 N.E.2d 831, 844 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65,
76 (Mo. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 NJ. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
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Knight dissent analogized this notice to the notice required to be given
by a party claiming a breach of the implied warranty of quality and
fitness imposed on builders and sellers of newly constructed real prop-
erty.14 "'The requirement of notice is based on a sound commercial
rule designed to allow the [builder or seller] opportunity for repairing
the defective item. . . .,,4
The argument advanced by the Knight dissent fails to recognize an
important distinction between the warranty of habitability implied in
residential leases 50 and the warranty of fitness implied in sales of new
construction."5 ' Once a builder has completed construction and the
vendor has sold the property, actual notice by the purchaser is the only
means by which the builder or seller can be apprised of defective con-
ditions. The parties do not have a continuing mutuality of obligation
(assuming the vendor is not the mortgagee of the property). Under the
implied warranty of habitability, however, the landlord's responsibility
to maintain habitable premises and the tenant's liability for rent are
mutually dependent covenants."5 2 The tenant's duty to pay rent ceases
upon the landlord's breach of the warranty.1 5 3 Therefore, a tenant's
withholding of rental payments constitutes notice to the landlord of a
breach of the warranty, and of defects requiring repair. 15 4
148. 29 Cal. 3d at 66-67, 623 P.2d at 280-81, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(citing Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 379-80, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 648, 651 (1974)).
149. 29 Cal. 3d at 66, 623 P.2d at 280-81, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 652).
150. See supra text accompanying note 4; see also supra note 42.
151. Builders and sellers of new construction impliedly represent that the completed
structure was designed and constructed in a reasonably workmanlike manner. 12 Cal. 3d at
380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
152. See supra note 4.
153. As the Illinois Appellate Court reasoned in Jarrell v. Hartman, 48 Ill. App. 3d 985,
987, 363 N.E.2d 626, 628 (1977):
It would be strange indeed to require a tenant to give a landlord notice of what the
law is with reference to the landlord's duty or duties. Furthermore, we are una-
ware of any common law contract principle which requires the nonbreaching party
to fulfill such conditions precedent prior to suit against the breaching party.
154. Myers, Implied Warranty ofHabitability, 4 L.A. LAW. 34, 39 (1981). URLTA, supra
note 5, sets forth a definition of notice which would support the abandonment of the require-
ment that actual notice of defects be given, and recognize that the act of withholding rent
constitutes notice. URLTA, supra note 5, § 1.304 provides in pertinent part that:
(a) A person has notice of a fact if...
(3) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists ....
(b) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another person by
taking steps reasonably calculated to inform the other in ordinary course whether
or not the other actually comes to know of it. ...
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Because a landlord is obligated to provide a habitable dwelling
and to repair subsequent dilapidations,'55 he or she should be required
to verify that a tenant's nonpayment of rent is not due to the existence
of defective conditions in the residence, ie., that there has not been a
breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The landlord's duty to
deliver and maintain a habitable dwelling supports the inference of a
concomitant right to enter the premises for purposes of making peri-
odic inspections;15 6 and it is not unreasonable to compel the landlord to
inspect the premises for defects.
1 57
The Knight court did not consider the issue of notice.158 The elim-
ination of the "reasonable time to repair" requirement, however, may
be the precursor of the demise of the notice requirement. If, prior to
claiming a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, a tenant
must notify the landlord of defects to allow the landlord an opportunity
to repair,159 but the requirement of reasonable time to repair is elimi-
nated, the notice requirement is superfluous. As an independent ele-
ment the notice requirement is insignificant because of the mutual
dependence of the landlord's obligation to maintain habitable premises
and of the tenant's duty to pay rent. 6 If the landlord breaches the
implied warranty of habitability, the tenant's duty to pay rent ceases. 6'
This mutuality of obligation would be meaningless if the tenant could
not assert a landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability until he or
she notified the landlord of defects, and allowed the landlord a reason-
155. This obligation is imposed by the common law warranty of habitability and by stat-
ute. See supra notes 4, 42.
156. Love, supra note 34, at 105. California law provides that a landlord may enter a
dwelling unit to make necessary or agreed repairs. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954 (West Supp.
1982).
157. Although some defects will be obvious to tenants, this should not negate the land-
lord's responsibility to inspect. Generally, a tenant does not possess the expertise to ade-
quately conduct an inspection. For example, a tenant has no way of ascertaining if the
plumbing, heating and wiring systems are defective. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596,
111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961); see supra text accompanying note 39. Additionally, the lessor,
not the lessee, is advised of building code regulations and violations. Skillern, supra note 4,
at 397-98. The lease agreement could require the landlord to conduct annual inspections and
perform a yearly certified maintenance. See Grigsby, supra note 102, at 536-37. The land-
lord and tenant may agree to shift the burden of repair or improvement onto the tenant in
return for reduced rent. Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. at 61, 390 A.2d at 246 (Spaeth, J.,
concurring). The enforceability of such an agreement would depend on a showing of a good
faith understanding between parties of equal bargaining power that such improvements will
in fact be made. Id; see also supra note 47.
158. See supra note 58.
159. See supra text accompanying note 149.
160. See 29 Cal. 3d at 55, 623 P.2d at 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
161. See Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 635, 517 P.2d at 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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able time to repair."'
C. Change in Ownership and a Tenant's Claim of Breach
The Knight court held that it was improper to read Civil Code
section 823163 as a jury instruction in a suit involving a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability where the tenant did not seek recovery
for damages caused by the previous owner nor retroactive rent reduc-
tions for any period before the change of ownership.'" The defective
conditions existed when the new landlord acquired ownership of the
building and the obligation to maintain habitable premises was imme-
diately imposed on the new landlord.165 The rent withheld by the ten-
ants was claimed due by the new landlord. Because the tenants had an
independent claim against the new landlord, the case did not fall
within the purview of section 823.
Dicta in Knight suggested, however, that section 823 might be ap-
plicable to situations where a tenant does cross-complain against a new
landlord for damages caused by a former owner or does claim retroac-
tive rent reductions for any period before the change of ownership.'
66
In Standard Livestock, the court interpreted section 823 as follows:
The remedy which a lessee of premises has against the lessor,
or his assigns, for an accrued or already created breach of any
agreement in the lease passes to the lessee's assigns, and may
be asserted by the latter against the lessor or his assigns. The
two exceptions expressed in the section are that accrued reme-
dies for already ripened breaches of covenants against encum-
brances or relating to the title or possession of the premises do
not so pass but remain with the original lessee. But neither of
these exceptions nor in fact the section as a whole has any
reference to breaches of the lease which have not occurred,
nor to remedies therefor which have not arisen prior to the
assignment of the lease. The assignment of a lease when le-
162. See Jarrell v. Hartman, 48 IMl. App. 3d 985, 987, 363 N.E.2d 626, 628 (1977) (in
action for breach of implied warranty of habitability, court held that tenant need not give
landlord notice and chance to repair) (citing Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972) (court recognized that implied warranty of habitability may be raised as a
defense and did not impose requirement of notice and chance to repair)). But see Berman &
Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981, 986 (Mass. 1979) (court upheld notice requirement
for purposes of determining date from which rent abatement began, but did not require that
tenants allow landlord a reasonable time to repair).
163. See supra note 22.
164. 29 Cal. 3d at 56-57, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
165. See supra note 42.
166. See 29 Cal. 3d at 56-57, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
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galy accomplished transfers to the assignee the right to the
enforcement of every unbroken covenant which the lease con-
tains, but does not transfer those ripened choses in action
which come within the exceptions in. . . [section 823].167
If the tenant in an unlawful detainer action cross-complains
against the landlord for damages arising from a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability, the cross-complaint will only survive if the
tenant has surrendered possession of the premises prior to trial.'
68
Once the issue of possession is eliminated, the tenant would be able to
seek recovery from the new landlord for damages caused by the previ-
ous owner. Section 823, as interpreted by StandardLivestock, expressly
allows a lessee a claim against the lessor's assignee for "an accrued or
already created breach of any agreement in the lease."'
169
The Knight court did not decide whether a tenant could claim ret-
roactive rent reductions for any period before the change in ownership.
The court did conclude, however, that a forfeiture of a tenant's rights
under the implied warranty of habitability should not occur upon the
"fortuitous circumstance of a change in ownership of the premises."'
70
Although the court did not explain this observation, the implication is
that the policy considerations underlying the warranty' 7 protect a ten-
ant from losing his or her rights when a change in ownership occurs. 172
VI. CONCLUSION: HABITABILITY AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY AFTER KNIGHT vi HLLSTHAMMAR
The California Supreme Court, in Knight, prudently refused to
dictate an immutable definition of "habitability." Expanding upon the
Green court's basic premise that the implied warranty of habitability
167. Standard Livestock v. Pentz, 204 Cal. at 629-30, 269 P. at 649-50. Standard Livestock
is the only case interpreting the meaning of the language of section 823.
168. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1170 (West 1982) provides that "[o]n or before the day
fixed for his appearance, the defendant may appear and answer or demur." To preserve the
summary character of an unlawful detainer proceeding, the courts have interpreted this sec-
tion as prohibiting the filing of a cross-complaint. Erbe v. W & B Realty Co., 255 Cal. App.
2d 773, 778, 63 Cal. Rptr. 462,465 (1967). Such pleadings are permitted, however, where the
tenant has voluntarily surrendered possession of the premises before trial, and the issue of
possession is thus removed from the case. Id; Heller v. Melliday, 60 Cal. App. 2d 689, 696,
141 P.2d 447, 451 (1943).
169. See supra text accompanying note 167.
170. 29 Cal. 3d at 59, 623 P.2d at 276, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
171. See supra text accompanying note 34.
172. It is beyond the scope of this casenote to discuss further the interrelation between
§ 823 and the implied warranty of habitability. As the court indicated, § 823 may not apply
at all to the implied warranty of habitability. 29 Cal. 3d at 57, 623 P.2d at 274, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 713.
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relates to conditions which concern the tenant's bare living require-
ments, Ze., defective conditions materially affecting liveability, the
Knight court attributed flexible standards to habitability.173 In deter-mining habitability, trial courts must consider applicable building and
housing code standards, statutory requirements for a tenantable dwell-
ing, and the fundamental precept that a dwelling must be fit for human
habitation.
Knight further developed the doctrine of the implied warranty of
habitability. A tenant can assert the landlord's breach of warranty
without first allowing the landlord a reasonable time to repair any
claimed defects in the premises. A tenant is not required to inspect the
premises prior to occupancy, and awareness of defective conditions at
the time the tenant takes possession of the residence will not constitute
a waiver of the breach. The notice requirement is still a litigable issue,
and a tenant who plans to withhold rent because of uninhabitable con-
ditions would be wise to so inform the landlord.
Mara J. Bresnick
173. But see Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1077 (court held that implied
warranty of habitability is measured by standards set out in housing regulations). In Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973), the court implied both
code-based and general warranty. Under Florida law, a tenant can raise as a defense a
landlord's material noncompliance with the obligation to maintain the roofs, windows,
screens, doors, floors, steps, porches, exterior walls, foundations, and all other structural
components in good repair and capable of resisting normal forces and loads and the plumb-
ing in reasonable working condition. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.51(1), 83.60(l) (West Supp.
1982). Under URLTA, supra note 5, § 2.104(a), the landlord must comply with the require-
ments of applicable building and housing codes and make all repairs and do whatever is
necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.
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